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platitude hides a more complex relationship that would be advantageous to understand.
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P R E A M B L E
This article explores the question “Do maps tell 
stories?” by examining how a map artifact comes to carry 
complex and sophisticated meaning. The approach is con-
ceptual, but the results are practical. The core issue is 
whether maps really do tell stories, or if that glib platitude 
hides a more complex relationship that would be advanta-
geous to understand.
At this point, some might ask: “So What? Does saying 
that maps tell stories do any harm?” No more harm, really, 
than repeating any other platitude like, “the moon is made 
of green cheese”—harmless in normal conversation, but a 
very different matter when professed in public or taught in 
school. Cartography is supposed to be an informed prac-
tice, and the tenets of an informed practice should stand 
up to scrutiny. This scrutiny should be carried out “not 
carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in ordinary life …, 
but critically, after exploring all that makes such questions 
puzzling, and after realizing all the vagueness and confu-
sion that underlie our ordinary ideas” (Russell 1912, 7).
This paper’s analysis and conclusions are not confined to 
what are sometimes called “narrative” or “story” maps, 
or to any other particular type or style of map, because 
every map must facilitate the discovery of some meaning 
or other. For that reason the discussion that follows is con-
cerned with how meaning is found in any map: trendy or 
dowdy, old or new, paper or plastic, regardless of what that 
particular meaning might be.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Maps and stories are intimately related. On the one 
hand, a map must be fit into a coherent story in order to 
be understandable, while, on the other, a map provides 
key persuasive arguments that may lead a reader to adopt 
a particular story explaining some milieu or situation. 
Recently, this relationship has sometimes been shortened 
to: “Maps Tell Stories.”
While seemingly innocuous, the statement “Maps Tell 
Stories” raises some thorny questions about the map/story 
relationship. For example: if a map tells a story, does it tell 
the same story to everyone?
There is both professional and commercial interest in the 
notion of storytelling maps. For example, the three most 
recent North American Cartographic Information Society 
(NACIS) conferences have seen both formal addresses and 
session presentations on the topic. As well, the Esri com-
pany has made “Story Mapping” something of a byword 
for their online mapping services, while other individuals 
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and organizations use terms like “narrative map.” Still, 
there is very little evidence that the implications of the 
map storytelling notion have been much examined.
WHAT ARE MAPS? WHAT ARE STORIES?
It is interesting to note that Randall Munroe includ-
ed both “map” and “story” amongst “The Ten Hundred 
Words People Use The Most” (Munroe 2015, 57–60); 
that is, the thousand words that are “simple and familiar” 
enough to make up the vocabulary for his 2015 book Thing 
Explainer: Complicated Stuff in Simple Words. Munroe as-
sumes that the words in his list denote concepts common 
enough to need no definition, and for his purposes this 
assumption is reasonable. This discussion, however, will 
hinge upon these terms, so their meanings must be de-
clared usefully and comprehensively.
Defining “so ambiguous and complex a cultural object as 
the map” (Pickles 2004, 19) is not simple, because “not 
only are maps multivocal, not only are the spaces they con-
structively represent complex articulations of coded and 
nomadic spaces, but so also must be our accounts of them” 
(Pickles 2004, 19). This need for a multifaceted definition 
was addressed by Christian Jacob when he wrote of the 
map as “the projection and materialization of a mental 
schema on a medium. The materialization of an abstract 
intellectual order extracted from the empirical universe” 
(Jacob 2006, 30). Jacob’s is a broad, usable definition of 
the map artifact; one that is practically and uncontrover-
sially applicable to the full range of everything that has 
been or might be identifiable as a map.
I, myself, (2003) further described the map as a rhetor-
ical entity that must be “useful, usable, and persuasive.” 
This description centralizes what it is that any and every 
map must do, regardless of map type or form. Between 
these two complementary definitions the map is fully, if 
abstractly, characterized: together, they define what a map 
is and what it must do.
What, on the other hand, are stories?
The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (1971) 
defines story as “an allegation; a statement; an account or 
representation of a matter; a particular person’s represen-
tation of the facts in a case.”
This definition particularizes the term story as a narrative 
with a purposeful point of view, an argument for under-
standing something a certain way. It harmonizes well with 
what I have written about how a map is always, and nec-
essarily, presenting some particular proposition, and at-
tempts to frame its presentation of that position so as to 
naturalize its propositions to the beliefs and assumptions 
of the map user.
There is, clearly, a close relation between between maps 
and stories, but is the map actually telling a story?
DO MAPS REALLY TELL STORIES?
In her talk at the 2014 NACIS Annual Meeting, Do 
Maps Really Tell Stories? The Problem of Narrative Time in 
Cartography, Anne Knowles spoke about some of the prac-
tical and conceptual issues she and her associates had been 
encountering in a project to tell some very specific stories 
with maps.
She was, at a certain stage, disconcerted to discover that 
her patrons were positively repelled by maps she had pre-
pared: what she had found moving, they found cold and of-
fensive. How was it that maps that she and her associates 
saw as telling particular, moving stories seemed to tell her 
partners such very different, repellent stories? Here, then, 
is the crux of the biscuit: if maps tell stories, why did these 
maps tell different stories to different people?
A PARABLE
Knowles is not the first to see different observers read very 
different stories from a single narrative graphic. Lewis 
Carroll described the same sort of thing in this excerpt 
from his short story “A Photographer’s Day Out.”
PICTURE 5: This was to have been the great 
artistic triumph of the day; a family group, de-
signed by the two parents, and combining the 
domestic with the allegorical. It was intended to 
represent the baby being crowned with flowers, 
by the united efforts of the children, regulated 
by the advice of the father, under the personal 
superintendence of the mother; and to combine 
with this the secondary meaning of “Victory 
transferring her laurel crown to Innocence, 
with Resolution, Independence, Faith, Hope 
and Charity, assisting in the graceful task, 
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while Wisdom looks benignly on, and smiles 
approval!” Such, I say, was the intention; the re-
sult, to any unprejudiced observer, was capable 
of but one interpretation — that the baby was 
in a fit—that the mother (doubtless under some 
erroneous notions of the principles of Human 
Anatomy), was endeavoring to recover it by 
bringing the crown of its head in contact with 
its chest—that the two boys, seeing no prospect 
for the infant but immediate destruction, were 
tearing out some locks of its hair as mementos 
of the fatal event—that two of the girls were 
waiting for a chance at the baby’s hair, and em-
ploying the time in strangling the third—and 
that the father, in despair at the extraordinary 
conduct of his family, had stabbed himself, and 
was feeling for his pencil-case, to make a mem-
orandum of having done so.
(Carroll 1976, 1093)
Knowles, and the parents in Carroll’s story, had each as-
sembled a graphic (map or image) that they saw as carry-
ing one or more specific stories, and each felt it was not 
unreasonable to expect that these stories would be retold 
intact to their respective audiences. In each case, however, 
neither the map nor the image managed to do this. Why?
STORIES DON’T COME FROM THE MAP
Maps (as well as graphics and images) require interpreta-
tion, both as a whole and in their individual constituent 
parts. Part of map reading leverages the reader’s ability to 
see and recognize symbols as signs, and other parts de-
pend on the reader’s facility in finding meaning in the 
recognized signs. Out of this material alone, however, no 
one can be sure they are correct in their reading: that they 
have found the right story. One has to bring in a context 
external to the map itself; a context composed of a combi-
nation of what one thinks one has read in the map, what 
one knows about maps, one’s own knowledge about the 
topic or milieu, and the context in which the map is situat-
ed. Whether or not one recognizes or accepts the proposi-
tions the map is presenting, one is not compelled to find any 
particular story in any particular map. One finds the story 
that satisfies oneself alone as a reasonable reading.
As Jacob remarked “…on the map no privileged course is 
given, nor any narrative imposed or set in place. … the 
reader becomes the author of and the actor in his or her 
own fictions” (Jacob 2006, 285).
Considering the map of central Europe shown in Figure 
1, one can recognize the shapes of the countries depicted, 
and that the map somehow concerns air travel. The graph-
ic style (depiction of aircraft, use of solid black) and the 
national outlines indicate the historical period. Where to 
go from here? It might seem reasonable to guess that this 
map would be a part of an advertisement campaign by a 
Czech air cargo company (CzechEx?) promoting their 
speedy package delivery service from a hub in Prague to 
customers in the German market. In fact, one must turn 
to information external to the map, information that sur-
rounds and frames the map more or less closely, to divine 
the story. Only then can a reader take into consideration a 
range of other knowledge—political, social, and histori-
cal knowledge, for example—beyond the ink on the paper 
and other maps they may have seen. The reader can also 
consider contexts, such as where the map appears, the 
agendas ascribed to whoever it was that placed the map 
there, what the reader thinks of those people and agendas, 
and the reader’s guesses about the story those people ex-
pected to be taken away. Wood and Fels (2008, 8) referred 
to these framing contexts as the perimap, as contrasted to 
the epimap, which is the inky bit. Only after the reader has 
considered (or chosen to ignore) this horizon of knowledge 
can they construct an understanding: the story they actu-
ally take away.
Figure 1. German magazine map by Rupert von Schumacher. 1934.
Cartographic Perspectives, Number 84, 20168 | Storied Maps – Denil
MAPS NEED STORIES
A story is important to the map; arguably, in most cases, 
more important than the map is to the story. Stories are 
how humans make sense of the world, and Somerset 
Maugham reminds us just how closely our natures are tied 
to storytelling.
…the delight of listening to stories is as natu-
ral to human nature as the delight in looking 
at the dancing and miming out of which the 
drama arose. That it exists unimpaired is shown 
by the vogue for the detective novel.
(Maugham 1954, 637)
We use stories to work through our experience and to 
fit what would otherwise be an incoherent, bewildering, 
meaningless set of facts or events into a coherent, under-
standable, meaningful, and moving experience.
In reading a map, it is the story that provides the service-
able context that the map must absorb and ref lect. It is 
only by absorbing a story that the map can support, en-
hance, and lend verisimilitude to it.
Absorbing a story? Reflecting a story? Is the map not sim-
ply telling a story? No; that is beyond its power. Maps are, 
as Robert Lewis Stevenson wrote, “mine[s] of suggestion” 
(Stevenson 1894, 11), but do not, and cannot, by them-
selves, tell stories to people: it is, instead, people that read 
stories into maps.
This is true of all maps, but not of maps alone. In point of 
fact, no graphic, in itself, harbors any meaning whatsoev-
er. Any graphic, such as a drawing, photograph, painting, 
graph, chart, or, of course, map, must be read and inter-
preted, and fit into a contextual understanding (fit into a 
narrative or story) in order to acquire meaning. This is well 
known.
D I S C U S S I O N
THEORETIC INTERLUDE
The roots of connection between the map and the 
story run very deep: right down, in fact, to the semiot-
ic bedrock where the the signifier (in this case, a map) is 
connected to the signified by means of a value or element 
(a story).
Ferdinand de Saussure recognized that the identity of a 
sign rests not in the sign itself, but in its relation to other 
signs through what he called a principle of linguistic value. 
The sign itself is empty, in that meaning does not reside 
within it, but is instead generated from the surrounding 
system. A significant component of that surrounding sys-
tem is the framing story that provides a context within 
which the sign is understood (Saussure 1916; Lupton and 
Miller 1996).
Unlike the primarily linguistic semiosis theory of 
Saussure, where the relationship between the sign and the 
real-world thing it denotes is an arbitrary, implicit one, 
Charles Sanders Peirce’s triadic semiotic model establishes 
an explicit three cornered connection between 1) the sign 
vehicle or representamen, 2) the interpretant, and 3) the ob-
ject to which the sign refers.
The key element in this irreducible triadic relationship is 
the interpretant. The interpretant is, in part, the contex-
tual story that a reader or user brings to the representam-
en (in this case, the artifact-that-would-be-a-map) and 
which allows it to be linked with an object (the stuff being 
mapped). It is only by virtue of this triangular linkage (a 
linkage that includes an interpretant) that the artifact can 
become a map (a representamen: a meaning bearing sign). 
The converse is also true: because the relationship is not 
reducible to action between pairs of elements (Peirce and 
Welby-Gregory 1977), neither can the map exist as a map 
without an interpretant (story). In short: something only 
becomes a map because the reader can fit it into a story.
DEMONSTRATIONS BY ANALOGY
Photographs work the same way. In Camera Lucida (1981), 
Roland Barthes examined photo after photo, and found 
none that could move him, or tell him any story, until he 
at last turned to a photo of his own mother: a person he 
recognized and for whom he already had a large mass of 
information, recollection, and emotion. Only then was 
he forced to f ind meaning. Barthes differentiated be-
tween cultural and personal meanings (which he termed 
the studium and punctum, respectively), but in all cases 
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saw that the meanings existed, in some form, beforehand 
and were only evoked or triggered by the image. “Such is 
the Photograph: it cannot say what it lets us see” (Barthes 
1981, 100; emphasis in original). The principle is clear: 
meaning does not lie in the photo itself; it is construed by 
the viewer by fitting the photo onto a story.
The artist Cindy Sherman has long leveraged the inevita-
bility of a viewer’s manufacture of story out of the slightest 
of materials. Her Untitled Film Stills (1977–80) consisted 
of photos of herself in what could pass as banal, ambigu-
ous film stills. The works demonstrate that meaning does 
not reside in the artifact, but is construed by the viewer to 
contextualize and explain the image.
Viewers know how to manufacture stories from what 
they assume are clues in Sherman’s photos because cul-
ture has trained them how to recognize a movie still, and 
how to interpret one. “So familiar are the characters that 
Sherman created in her photographs that film critics have 
been known to ‘recognize’ the movies to which they refer, 
although none actually relates directly to any particular 
film” (Gompertz 2012, 352). So ingrained is this predilec-
tion to story creation that it takes place in the mind of the 
viewer even when they know full well that Sherman’s pho-
tographs “depict fictional characters from films that never 
existed, [and] which, even if they had done, would also be 
fictitious” (Gompertz 2012, 353).
Sherman sets up a scenario wherein the viewer is led up 
a well-trodden path that leads nowhere at all. The reader 
then marches blithely off the end of the sidewalk and into 
the bushes, often not realizing that the only meaning that 
will be found is meaning they themselves have brought 
with them. The point is that it is not just a trick: this hap-
pens with all photographs.
Maps are no more able to tell stories than are photographs; 
a viewer or user must be a reader, and whatever clues the 
reader f inds must be recognized and interpreted, so the 
reader can, ultimately, fit them into a narrative.
MAKING SENSE
How can these examples be related to an everyday map 
reading? A useful formal model for understanding this 
was outlined by Erwin Panofsky (1955). According to 
Panofsky, in coming to understand an action (such as an 
acquaintance tipping his hat on the street) or artifact (such 
as a painting or a map), we can distinguish three distinct 
strata of meaning: 1) primary or natural subject matter, 2) 
secondary, or conventional subject matter, and 3) intrinsic 
meaning or content. These three strata are encountered or 
engaged in order.
The first, primary or natural, level involves what Panofsky 
terms pre-iconographic description. It is restricted to factu-
al and expressional elements, and keeps within the limits 
of whatever motifs are present. Our practical experience 
allows us to recognize circles or squares, lines or enclosed 
areas, simple or complex symbols, pictograms or imag-
es, etcetera. We might recognize the shapes of humans, 
plants, or animals in a picture, or the typical shapes and 
colors used to represent roads, cities, islands, or rivers on 
a map. Our personal experience may not extend to recog-
nizing the shape of a particular river or island, so “in such 
cases we have to widen the range of our practical experi-
ence by consulting a book or an expert: but we do not leave 
the sphere of practical experience as such, which informs 
us, needless to say, as to what kind of expert to consult” 
(Panofsky 1955, 33).
We have to be aware, however, that this interpretation is 
limited: we should not expect to apply it indiscriminately. 
“Our practical experience is indispensable, as well as suf-
ficient, as material for pre-iconographic description, but it 
does not guarantee its correctness” (Panofsky 1955, 33). 
Particularly, Panofsky warns about how graphic expres-
sion changes over time and across cultures. “While we be-
lieve that we are identifying the motifs on the basis of our 
practical experience pure and simple, we really are reading 
‘what we see’ according to the manner in which objects 
and events are expressed by forms under varying historical 
conditions” (Panofsky 1955, 35).
This is echoed by Kevin Moxey, who writes that “‘pure’ 
description is impossible, for the language used to describe 
objects is itself redolent with the values of its authors” 
(Moxey 1994, 102). In practice, all “description consti-
tutes interpretation” (Moxey 1994, 106), and what we see 
draws on what we know, what we recognize, and what we 
expect. Again, at the pre-iconographic strata, this is only 
goes so far: one might see a picture of a group of men sit-
ting around a dining table, but one would not yet see the 
Last Supper (Panofsky 1955).
This pre-iconographic description should not be confused 
with stages of vision, such as the “primal sketch” described 
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by David Marr (1982); the concern here is with the inter-
pretation of meaning, not with the mechanics of seeing.
The secondary strata concerns conventional meaning, or 
what is termed iconography. “It presupposes a familiarity 
with specific themes or concepts as transmitted through 
literary sources, whether acquired by purposeful reading 
or by oral tradition” (Panofsky 1955, 35). This includes 
elements such as vocabularies and grammars of symbol 
usage, like those proposed by Jacques Bertin (1983) and 
expanded by Alan MacEachren (1995), but it also encom-
passes what I (2011) have called the cartographic schema, 
or mapicity. As I wrote:
…collectively, the vocabulary [of map symbols 
and furniture], the grammar of their interac-
tion, and the canon of exemplars of good prac-
tice, together forms the schema, which can be 
thought of as a coherent terrain or horizon of 
understanding. The schema defines what for us, 
and the people who make up our interpretive 
community, is right, proper and appropriate for 
a map.
(Denil 2011, 12).
It is in Panofsky’s iconographic stage that one first sees 
how a map is trying to suggest a certain reading, and it is 
where one sees it try to support that reading by forwarding 
selected arguments couched in terms recognizable as legit-
imate forms of persuasive discourse.
But again, while an acquaintance with specif-
ic themes and concepts transmitted through 
literary sources is indispensable and sufficient 
material for an iconographical analysis, it does 
not guarantee correctness. It is just as impossi-
ble for us to give a correct iconographical anal-
ysis by indiscriminately applying our literary 
knowledge to the motifs as it is for us to give a 
correct pre-iconographical description by indis-
criminately applying our practical experience to 
the forms.
(Panofsky 1955, 36)
As an example, Panofsky cites a painting by a 17th-cen-
tury Venetian “representing a handsome young woman 
with a sword in her left hand and in her right a charger on 
which rests the head of a beheaded man” (Panofsky 1955, 
36). This painting had long been assumed, from icono-
graphical analysis, to be a portrayal of Salome (John the 
Baptist’s head had been brought to Salome on a charger). 
Clearly, however, Salome herself did not decapitate John, 
so why did she have a sword? Panofsky points out that if 
this were instead read as a painting of Judith with the head 
of Holofernes, we could account for the sword (which 
Judith is said to have employed), but not for the charger 
(according to the Bible, she put the head in a sack) (Judith 
13:6–10). Thus we see that there is no way to definitely 
understand the painting from an iconographical analysis 
alone. As it turns out, Panofsky was able to identify other 
contemporary northern Italian paintings of Judith hold-
ing a charger, and he backs up this evidence with other 
persuasive reasons that allowed picturing Judith with a 
charger, but not Salome with a sword. In other words, 
he went beyond iconographical analysis; in fact, he drew 
on information clearly external to the painting and to the 
conventional understanding of paintings, to arrive at a 
fuller, defensible, meaning. What he did was to construe a 
story that embodied a third strata of meaning: one that he 
called the intrinsic meaning.
Intrinsic meaning, Panofsky writes, is obtained through 
iconological interpretation. This term iconology is one 
Panofsky claimed to have revived in order to indicate an 
engagement or application beyond the “preliminary statis-
tical survey” role played by iconography. He explains:
…as the suff ix “graphy” denotes something 
descriptive, so does the suff ix “ logy”—de-
rived from logos, which means “thought” or 
“reason”—denote something interpretive. 
“Ethnology,” for instance, is defined as a “science 
of human races” by the same Oxford Dictionary 
that defines “ethnography” as a “description of 
human races, and Webster explicitly warns 
against a confusion of the two terms inasmuch 
as “ethnography is properly restricted to the 
purely descriptive treatment of peoples and 
races while ethnology denotes their compara-
tive study.”
(Panofsky 1955, 32; emphasis in original)
The intrinsic meaning to which Panofsky refers is nothing 
more or less than the story the map would (or might) be 
telling (if the map could tell stories). Significantly, it shows 
that the full meaning never comes from the artifact itself. 
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Quite the opposite: finding that full meaning is the work 
of the interpreter, using his or her experience, knowledge 
and initiative to bring an interpretive story to the work. 
Thus we see that the meaning (the story), as Keith Moxey 
writes, “is always imposed … by the interpreter” and that 
it is “a constructed narrative rather than one that is in-
scribed in the order of things” (Moxey 1994, 5).
All map users come preloaded with assumptions, recol-
lections, prejudices, attitudes, and narratives; it mostly 
comes from their cultural communities (Fish 1980), but 
they flatter themselves by calling it knowledge. It is out of 
this knowledge that they pull stories, and an idea of how to 
fit a map into those stories. Panofsky’s model shows how 
that knowledge is applied with increasing sophistication at 
each strata to come ultimately to a consciousness of a story 
to ascribe to a map.
But surely the map itself must play some part, beyond pro-
viding points, lines, and areas, in bringing the story into 
the personal or shared consciousness; and indeed, it does. 
The map presents what might be termed arguments or 
propositions about a situation (Denil 2003; Jacob 2006; 
Wood and Fels 2008), and the user leverages their own in-
terpretation of these propositions to create, adapt, or adopt 
a story into which to fit the map.
BUILDING INTERSECTING STORIES
A dramatic and complex performance of meaning con-
struction from (ostensibly) purely visual text was demon-
strated by Italo Calvino in his novella The Castle of Crossed 
Destinies (1969). In a mysterious castle, twelve stories are 
related by mute castle guests and their voiceless host by 
each participant laying out tarot cards in lines. The inter-
secting card sequences form a set of stories while build-
ing into what becomes a single, large tarot constellation. 
Another twelve silent “story tellers” then step forward and 
reuse the existing patterns to tell their own stories; often 
pointing to each card in reverse order to a previously told 
tale. As Calvino notes:
…as one guest is advancing his strip, another, 
from the other end, advances in the opposite 
direction, because the stories told from left to 
right or from bottom to top can also be read 
from right to left or from top to bottom, and 
vice versa, bearing in mind that the same cards, 
presented in a different order, often change 
their meaning, and the same tarot is used at the 
same time by narrators who set forth from the 
four cardinal points.
(Calvino 1969, 41)
In a note at the end of the volume, the author writes that 
“This book is made first of pictures—the tarot playing 
cards—and secondly of written words. Through the se-
quence of the pictures stories are told, which the written 
word tries to reconstruct and interpret” (Calvino 1969, 
123). Calvino’s narrator, however, draws on a good deal 
more than the cards themselves to construct each story 
he believes is being told. He describes each card as it is 
laid down, noting the exquisite and engaging detail of the 
cards in the Milanese Renaissance Visconti-Sforza tarot 
pack. By this, and by drawing attention to, for example, 
resemblances between the card figures and the story teller, 
or to other motifs, the narrator engages the first strata of 
Panofsky’s model. References to the rich traditional ico-
nography of the various card figures brings in second strata 
meaning, while the play of associations—and, in part, the 
impetus given by the momentum of the building interpre-
tation itself—brings the narrator to the discovery of a fully 
realized tale (Panofsky’s third strata). How else could the 
narrator leap from some cards on a table to a recitation of 
imagined conversations? He has construed a story.
However, the construct and interpretation (the story) is 
that of the narrator: there is no reason to expect that any 
of the narrator’s companions would have placed the same, 
or even similar, constructs and interpretations on the cards 
and their order. As the companions do not speak, no one 
can know what stories they “heard.”
Calvino’s narrator himself is wary of claiming to have fully 
understood any of the stories.
I have no idea how many of us managed to de-
cipher the tale somehow, without getting lost 
among all those low cards, cups and coins, that 
popped up just when we were most eager for 
a clear exposition of the facts. The narrator’s 
powers of communication were scant, perhaps 
because his genius was more inclined to the se-
verity of abstractions than to the obviousness 
of images. In any case, some of us allowed our 
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minds to wander, or we lingered over certain 
couplings of cards and were unable to go on.
(Calvino 1969, 21)
Similarly, just because individuals are all presented with 
the same visual motifs (the same map), and are (just 
maybe) in possession of the same cultural heritage and 
same (no doubt, rigorous) training in map reading, does 
not ensure that they are going to construe (or are capable 
of construing) the same stories, or of understanding the 
construed stories the same way. Again, just as one’s for-
tune is not told so much by the cards as by the crone in her 
tent who interprets them, a map does not so much tell a 
story as facilitate reading one into it.
TURNING FROM CARDS TO CARTES
Calvino has shown that he could manufacture stories out 
of an ordering of tarot cards, and his manner of doing so 
can be analyzed using Panofsky’s model, but maps are 
generally far more complex than a pattern of cards. Can 
this model be applied to reading a map?
It has, in fact, been applied, if not consciously, by Denis 
Wood and John Fels in their 2008 book The Natures of 
Maps: Cartographic Constructions of the Natural World. 
Their third chapter, titled “Reading Land of Living Fossils,” 
is a careful, persistent, exhaustive (and exhausting) close 
reading of a 1979 National Geographic map. They begin 
by approaching the folded map, and carefully examine 
each stage of their encounter with it; observing primitive 
elements, discovering increasingly complex associations, 
and identifying motifs. At strata one, they describe, for 
example:
…this lush, gorgeous, almost tactile rendering 
in tawny shades of khaki and sand and light-
ly done toast. The colors slip through old ivory 
and olivesheen and citron to conclude in a deep 
grass-green, minty, almost viridian in the shad-
ows of the Atherton Tableland. There is a ripe-
ness about the rendering, a swelling, a fullness.
(Wood and Fels 2008, 37)
From there they draw in intersecting networks of (strata 
two) iconographic denotation and connotation.
What modulates smoothly on the poster-side 
map from the palest of Caucasian winter-skin 
“whites” to watermelon-rind green, goose-steps 
on the main-map side from Western-Australian 
pink to South-Australian purple to Queensland 
yellow. What on the poster-side map was a 
“self-distinguishing” landscape of gradually 
varying landforms (mountains, valleys, plains), 
is severed, on the main map, into land status 
types, aboriginal lands (bounded by a black line 
shadowed in gray); and wildlife sanctuaries, 
nature reserves, and national parks (bounded 
by dashed lines and filled with green). What 
on the poster side explodes from the map in 
abundant profusion (animals, which is to say, 
nature) is on the main map corralled, bordered, 
set apart (in parks). Everything else is white….
(Wood and Fels 2008, 39; 
emphasis in original)
Finally, the authors pull the skein together in a coherent 
story of (strata three) construed meaning.
The two sides of the map are connected in pre-
cisely this way: the land of living fossils—the 
poster side, the wild and wacky animals, and 
the wild and wacky terrain they imply (the 
lushly painted land of the poster’s map)—are 
subsumed within the bounded and often recti-
linear areas of green on the—how to say this?—
more “comprehensive,” more “real-world” main 
map of Australia, which while not a USGS 
topo quad is almost as authoritative. In the 
terminology of our introduction, nature as 
cornucopia (theme of profligacy) is subsumed 
within nature as park. Simultaneously, nature 
as park takes on the color of the profligate. In 
other words, nature as park authorizes nature as 
cornucopia. It says, “I am authoritative, so that 
is authoritative.” Nature as cornucopia colors, 
perfuses nature as park. It says, “In Australia 
nature is bountiful, it is extravagant,” and so 
it becomes hard to see the shape of Australia 
without seeing koalas, wallabies, kangaroos. 
But this effect occurs in our heads. It’s not on 
the paper.
(Wood and Fels 2008, 42; 
emphasis in original)
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This detailed, introspective, and insightful map reading 
constitutes a virtuoso performance of what each reader 
does, albeit usually in a less deliberate and self-conscious 
manner, each and every time any reader encounters any 
map. Wood and Fels demonstrate the ubiquity themselves; 
in each of the eight chapters that follows “Reading Land 
of Living Fossils” in The Natures of Maps, they stage ab-
breviated performances of the same reading method over 
and over again. Starting from simple descriptions of mo-
tifs, they invoke a web of connotation and association and 
finally leap headlong into a fully realized story: one that 
they themselves have conjured in their own heads.
“This effect occurs in our heads. It’s not on the paper” 
(Wood and Fels 2008, 42): “Aye, there’s the rub” (Hamlet 
Act III, Scene I). Wood and Fels have come to this story 
(the story they themselves tell) only by way of a deliberate 
construction of meaning, an intrinsic part of which is the 
conceit that the map itself has “told” them this. They man-
age, time after time, to get from the ink on the paper to 
places (variously) of sublime grandeur, wonder, awe, mys-
tery, domesticity, and/or ownership to which the various 
map authors may or may not have wished to lead them, 
but which Wood and Fels themselves have shown to be 
their own chosen destinations.
They find themselves, for example, chilled by maps of 
Everest and Antarctica. The authors write: “The myriad 
ridges are rock solid yet razor sharp, the glaciers—the en-
tire map in fact—icy cold, and the thin air as transparent 
as a vacuum” (Wood and Fels 2008, 117) about the Everest 
map. Similarly, in regard to a map of Antarctica, they are 
certain that: “This map is cold—extremely cold … it is al-
most surprising to touch the map and not feel one’s finger 
tips stinging with cold” (Wood and Fels 2008, 121). These 
histrionic tales are clearly nothing but the flapping of the 
authors’ own over-heated imaginations. They are stories 
inspired and facilitated by the map, but quite patently not 
told by the map. It’s in the authors’ heads, not on the paper. 
One may believe that “most National Geographic maps … 
tell you how they want to be read by the way they unfold 
themselves” (Wood and Fels 2008, 36), but the voice one 
hears in one’s head is one’s own.
Wood and Fels stage their virtuoso reading performanc-
es throughout The Natures of Maps, but the meanings they 
find at each strata, and indeed at every turn and twist of 
their relentless autopsies, are not necessarily, or in some 
cases, even likely, the ones someone else would find in 
their own encounter with the artifact. Of course not: it is 
not to be expected that the story (or stories) any one read-
er, or even this pair of passed master readers, find in any 
map would be universal. Remember, “this effect occurs in 
our heads. It’s not on the paper” (Wood and Fels 2008, 
42): the intrinsic meanings, the map stories, do not reside 
in the map and are not “told” by the map. The map in-
stead presents propositions and arguments (which Wood 
and Fels call postings) that play to the assumptions and 
predilections of the reader(s), and thus strive to insinuate 
themselves into the stories constructed by the reader(s). 
Sometimes the map succeeds in its efforts, and at other 
times it fails. Occasionally, the map becomes entirely the 
puppet of its audience. This is called a counter-reading.
COUNTER- READING
It is important to recognize that counter-readings are en-
tirely legitimate interpretations, and not simply an exercise 
in facing a map and saying: “Tisn’t” (Monty Python 1972). 
A counter-reading is not a denial of the map’s propositions; 
it is a commandeering or hijacking of a map’s arguments 
to fit a new story. The deliberate counter reader assumes 
that their counter-reading is antithetical to the intentions 
of the map issuer, but the intentions of the map issuer are 
in any and all events entirely an assumption by the reader, 
and thus a part of the counter (or any other) story. The 
assumption may well be very good and accurate, but it is 
an assumption nonetheless. Subversion is in the eye of the 
beholder. Thus, a counter-reading is as real and legitimate 
as any other reading, and employs the self-same mecha-
nisms for construing meaning, and the same conceits of 
correctness.
TEMPLATES AND APP-TITUDES
Esri has adopted the notion of storytelling maps as a 
central marketing trope for their ArcGIS Online map 
services. They provide customers with several variant on-
line map application (app) templates, at various levels of 
complexity, that can be used more or less as-is or cus-
tomized in different ways to any level of sophistication. 
The template library allows the map/app maker to create 
a website focusing on one, two, or many maps; to struc-
ture their presentation for guided or random access; and 
to handle delivery of text, photos, links, etcetera in several 
ways (Esri 2016b). This certainly seems like a very useful 
and comprehensive range of starting points, well suited to 
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accommodating many map presentation and usability af-
fordance needs.
However, the templates do not so much assist the map in 
telling a story as they facilitate an integration of maps and 
text with other material in a digital environment. A look 
through the Story Map Gallery (Esri 2016a) bears this out. 
It is never the maps themselves that are speaking: while 
the maps are showing one or more propositions as fact, it 
is the text that is giving explicit guidance on how the facts 
are to be construed. This is no different from any other 
type of map or map/text integration: the templates are 
only leveraging and making accessible to map/app mak-
ers new tools to do what map makers have always done 
(or have tried to do). Story Maps no more tell stories in a 
digital environment than the breakthrough of integrating 
wood-block maps with printing type on a page allowed 
Hartmann Schedel’s maps to tell stories (1493).
Esri Story Maps clearly do a pretty good job of what is 
within their power; however, it is also clear in reviewing 
the results that stories are not told by these maps but are 
construed from them.
The same could be said of the communal on-line atlas 
MapStory (2016), which offers a similar, but non-com-
mercial, tool set and platform. In one short essay on the 
MapStory site, “Making sense of dynamic change in a glob-
al world,” Jonathan Marino writes that “Mapstorytelling 
can’t itself provide this dynamic understanding [by itself]. 
But by giving the general public a place to share and edit 
data and deploy these data in the form of annotated geo-
spatial narratives that can travel far and wide across the 
world wide web, it can play an important part” (Marino 
2015).
In all these cases, and regardless of the technology em-
ployed, we see that the map maker’s task is still to use the 
persuasive powers of the map to guide and coerce the user’s 
construction of meaning so as to adopt a story the makers 
or their sponsors prefer the map user believe. If, in swal-
lowing the bait, the user fancies that the map itself has 
told him a story like a kindly cartographic Uncle Remus 
(Harris 1881), the map maker should see it as all well and 
good. As long as the user adopts something like the pro-
posed point of view as his own, it is a win for the map.
NARRATIVE AND CARTOGRAPHY
Sébastian Caquard, in his History of Cartography article 
“Narrative and Cartography” (2015), traces the twentieth 
century evolution of the map/text relationship. The time 
line he lays out, and the landmarks he identifies, are co-
gent and pertinent to the topic, but he errs when he leaps 
uncritically to a new identity or interchangeability be-
tween maps and narrative stemming from new technolo-
gy, particularly interactivity. His observation that “by the 
turn of the century, people were as likely to study Leopold 
Bloom’s travels through Dublin via on-line mapping as 
they were to study them through direct engagement with 
Joyce’s novel [Ulysses]” (Caquard 2015, 991) may well be 
correct, but that happenstance does not mean that the ex-
periences or stories gained each way are fungible. Stories 
built by the exclusively online mapping user are unlikely 
to be very much like the ones constructed by the reader 
of Joyce. No one could possibly reach Molly Bloom’s so-
liloquy from a map alone, however so very interactive that 
map might be.
Christian Jacob’s remark (quoted by Caquard) that “the 
reading of a map cannot be disassociated from narrative 
writing” (Jacob 2006, 294) is key: for the purposes of un-
derstanding the relationship between stories and maps, 
reading a map is narrative writing. One does not read a 
story previously embedded in a map; one writes a story of 
one’s own through interpreting rhetorical arguments for-
ward by a map.
RHETORIC
A map deploys native, rhetorical arguments and devices 
(tropes, figures, schemes, enthymemes, etcetera) in order 
to suggest readings and to persuade a reader to adopt 
them.
Rhetoric is the art of persuasion—traditionally of persua-
sive speaking or writing, but in recent decades the rhe-
torical nature of graphic design and communication has 
been explored by Hanno Ehses & Ellen Lupton (1988), 
by Richard Buchanan (1985), and by me (2003), among 
others. I have, in particular, shown how a cartographer 
employs rhetoric in composing a map. Aristotle (1932) 
showed that there are essentially two types of persuasive 
arguments: discovered and invented. In mapmaking, dis-
covered arguments would be called data (elevation data, 
census data, property descriptions, etcetera). Discovered 
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data is made plausible by the invented arguments of logos, 
pathos, and ethos (arguments of logic, emotion, and au-
thority) (Aristotle 1932, 8), which I (2003) identify as use 
(what the map is for), usability (how it can be used), and 
believability (why it should be used).
A N A LYS I S
Some maps go to great lengths to lead the user to a par-
ticular story; the following three examples leverage differ-
ent strategies to do that leading.
BOATING WITH CHAMPLAIN
Margaret Pearce and Michael Hermann’s (2008) map 
They Would Not Take Me There; People, Places and Stories 
from Champlain’s Travels in Canada, 1603–1616 (Figures 
2 and 3) presents a complex intersection of narrative and 
map that strongly urges a reader to see North America as 
Samuel de Champlain did in the 1600s. Surely this map 
tells a story, does it not?
Yet, as Daniel Huffman noted in his review of this map:
…Champlain’s words are the star. The text is 
supported and enhanced by the spatial repre-
sentation, not the other way around.
(Huffman 2012, 119)
In fact, the map does not tell Champlain’s story so much as 
frames it, contextualizes it, makes it accessible, and adds 
an air of verisimilitude. The framework of a story (narrated 
by Champlain) is supplied, and the map is tailored to ap-
pear to drop into place in it.
Figure 2. They Would Not Take Me There; People, Places and Stories from Champlain’s Travels in Canada, 1603–1616 by Margaret 
Pearce and Michael Hermann. 2008.
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This map is wrapped in Champlain’s commentary and fes-
tooned with his text; each feature on the map is present 
because it is tied to some episode or other, and its reason 
for appearing is Cham-splained with an excerpted note.
In They Would Not Take Me There, the second Panofskian 
strata aggressively encroaches on the third. Instead of just 
suggesting a normative reading (specifically, the point of 
view of the Father of New France), this map effectively 
employs a voice-over narration to dominate and colonize 
the map reader’s construction of strata three meaning. It 
would require a strong and determined reader (a veritable 
Roland Barthes) to avoid going along with this catechism, 
and even then it would seem likely that the only alterna-
tive is a wholesale rejection of the Champlain story.
None of this should be taken as criticism of the appro-
priateness or legitimacy (or the quality) of They Would Not 
Take Me There; nor does it disparage the ethics of the map’s 
authors. They Would Not Take Me There does exactly what 
it set out to do, and what it set out to do is exactly what 
a map of this sort must do. Had the authors done any-
thing less, they would have been doing a disservice to their 
program of rendering Champlain’s journal accessible and 
verisimilar. This analysis simply lays bare the mechanics of 
how the goal is accomplished.
A BONNY RAMBLE THERE-AND -BACK
The next example is Charles Joseph Minard’s (1869) fa-
mous map of Napoleon’s Russian Campaign of 1812 
(Figure 4) which, as Edward Tufte remarked, “tells a rich, 
coherent story” (Tufte 1983, 40).
Perhaps, though, it does not.
In his recent book Mapping Time, Menno-Jan Kraak 
clearly writes that in this map one can see what happened 
to Napoleon’s army, but not how or why.
Napoleon crossed the River Neman into Russia 
with 422,000 troops, and crossed it back into 
Poland with only 10,000. The f low map ex-
presses this disastrous outcome very clearly. 
However, it does not explain why the disaster 
occurred. The temperature diagram tempts 
Figure 3. Detail of They Would Not Take Me There.
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readers to conclude that the cold created the 
calamity. Many paintings of the campaign 
support this, with their stark depictions of sol-
diers succumbing to the harsh winter weather 
…. However, scrutiny of the map reveals that 
the largest drop in troop numbers occurred on 
the march toward Moskva, which took place 
during autumn. Did battle, desertion, or illness 
cause these losses? (Talty 2009) The map does 
not indicate the most important battles so it is 
hard to answer this question.
(Kraak 2014, 20)
Kraak seems to recognize that while the map provides 
factual information, and assembles the information into 
a proposition or argument about what happened when, 
where, and to whom, the story must be sorted out by the 
user.
In this map, Panofsky’s model works out in a more con-
ventional manner. Straight off, we see that great zig-zag 
of muscular lightning flash across the west Russian plains 
to strike the capital, and we see the slow, painful trickle of 
the retreat. This is visceral and emotive; pure Panofskian 
strata one. We also see the explicit links between the route 
and the temperature graph, a strata one feature that feeds 
straight into our strata two knowledge about conventional 
tellings of the Russian Campaign story. The map leaves 
things there, however; it is up to us to bring enough to the 
map to find a fuller (strata three) meaning. Kraak suggests 
that Stephan Talty’s The Illustrious Dead (2009) has some-
thing useful to contribute, and by bringing in Talty he is 
able to leap to a more fully realized strata three meaning. 
Many readers, however, will not have access to such re-
sources. These folks may well have to fall back on better 
known conventions, such as War and Peace (Tolstoy 2008) 
or the “many paintings of the campaign” (Kraak 2014, 20), 
and, in the end, perhaps, accept at face value the proposi-
tions of Minard’s map. They are persuaded to build their 
story from what it suggests. It would seem that Tufte did.
As can again be seen, not only is a story construed from 
strata one and two interpretations unreliable, but in all 
cases the map never tells a story, the reader construes it.
BUILDING A STORY OF ONE’S OWN
The third example is from Chris Ware’s novel in a box: 
Building Stories (2012). Ware’s work comes as close as is 
possible to actually mapping stories; both because many 
episodes are actually structured as maps and because the 
reader must negotiate a path through the work as a whole 
and, quite explicitly and deliberately, map out a story to 
build.
Figure 4. Figurative Map of the successive losses in men of the French Army in the Russian campaign 1812–1813. Charles Joseph Minard. 1869
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In this illustration (Figure 5) from the endpapers of one of 
the 14 small books, pamphlets, flyers, and cards assembled 
in Building Stories, one can see a woman lying in bed late 
at night, contemplating suicide.
The spread is, quite clearly, a map of the topography of 
this woman’s nighttime thoughts. She, and every reader, 
is able to, and in fact must, undertake a journey across 
and through this mental landscape. Like any topographic 
map, this map makes some landscape features explicit, and 
maintains silences on other features that may well exist; 
hiding them from both the sleepless woman and the map 
user.
Ware usually refuses to recommend a reading order for the 
materials in Building Stories (Hart 2012), and one assumes 
that this applies within the topography of this map as well. 
Building Stories is, in fact, a quintessential, paradigmatic, 
model for a topographic map. Ware, as map maker, pro-
vides material pitched to propose that one or more stories 
exist, but he refuses to say there is a correct story, or even 
to suggest that the reader should adopt or accept any par-
ticular one. Instead, the audience is required to explicitly 
bring their own interpretations forward, and tailor their 
story to fit what they themselves interpret as the evidence 
presented. This is what happens with any map anyway; but 
with most maps this process lies hidden between the map 
maker’s conceit and the user’s naivety.
Viewed through Panofsky’s model, one can see how Ware 
has carefully set a stage for both the strata one and two 
analysis that provides for launching into strata three in al-
most any direction. In the first strata one sees individually 
identifiable features, including the predominant motif of 
paths relentlessly looping back upon themselves. Second 
strata evaluation brings the reader face-to-face with the 
reality of the potential exits and the ramifications of that 
looping pattern: there seems no conventionally desirable 
way out. There is no question that the landscape is bleak 
and terrible; the author has plunked the map reader down 
between the devil and the deep blue sea, and surrounded 
them with a prospect of cliffs, crags, pestilential swamps 
Figure 5. Untitled front endpaper from an untitled component of Building Stories by Chris Ware. 2012.
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and searing deserts. Like any topographic map, the over-
all proposition of this map is that it is complete: that it 
shows all that is there, all that is truly possible, and pro-
vides all that one needs to know. Still, again like any topo-
graphic map, it leaves Ware’s reader (and his unfortunate 
character) to shift for themselves in making the leap to a 
strata three meaning. Neither Ware (nor the United States 
Geological Survey, for that matter), can guess what sort of 
story a particular reader might want or need told. In both 
cases they only propose that their maps are usable stage 
sets upon which to play out any chosen story.
C LO S E
A RECAP
What this all means is that there are at least three 
ways maps can integrate with stories. For example, some-
one could be telling a story, and they could haul out a map 
to support it: think here of Pearce and Hermann’s map 
(Figure 2), which sits in the context of Champlain’s nar-
rative. In such a case, the map is framed and bounded by 
the supplied story, and the reader has only to decide if that 
map supports that story.
Alternatively, a map could present a set of propositions de-
signed to persuade a user of the likelihood of certain facts: 
Minard’s map comes to mind here (Figure 4). Minard’s 
map proposes that people died and it was really cold. It is 
up to the reader to judge the validity and pertinence of the 
propositions and to construct his or her own story.
Or, again, as in the Ware map (Figure 5), a map may fa-
cilitate a range of readings, but with no particular read-
ing privileged. Here the story is most entirely the read-
er’s own. Topographic maps generally aspire to appear 
to do this, but all such maps still propose (at least) their 
own disinterested authority, reliability, and completeness. 
Other propositions can permeate these (and all types of) 
maps as well, in the hope and expectation of guiding the 
map user in construing a story.
Now, at this point a mapmaker might jump up and shout 
that any particular reader’s interpretation of the map is not 
what they, as creator, intended, and the mapmaker may 
well be quite right about that. If so, it’s kinda too bad. By 
that stage there is nothing at all that can be done about it: 
the mapmaker has missed their chance to lead the reader 
to that preferred reading.
As Northrop Frye has pointed out: “the [map] author’s in-
terpretation has a peculiar interest, but not a peculiar au-
thority” (Fry 1957, 5).
CONCLUSION
It is clear that, although maps and stories are bound to-
gether, a map does not actually tell a story. A map can 
only propose rhetorical arguments: it can set a contex-
tual stage, it can suggest the existence and pertinence of 
facts, and it can attempt to make its propositions appear 
reasonable. It is the map user or reader that must fit the 
map’s propositions into a narrative that resonates with a 
wider understanding—with a story. Formal examination 
of how meaning is construed can be facilitated by employ-
ing Panofsky’s model, which makes clear that while the 
reader learns many things directly from the map, the fully 
realized story comes through the user’s interpretation. The 
map cannot tell a story to the user: the user must make a 
place in a story for the map. Sometimes this fitting dra-
matically affects the story, and the story may become quite 
different, or even unrecognizable, after accommodat-
ing the map, but it was the map reader that effected the 
change and construed the new story: actual storytelling is 
beyond the map’s power.
Maps can propose facts, relationships, correlations, and 
situations that suggest or support some story, but fostering, 
influencing, or reinforcing a story is not the same as telling 
one. Stories are thrust upon the map, and fuller and richer 
stories are born from fuller and richer resources that are 
brought to bear through increasingly sophisticated strata 
of analysis; strata that draw increasingly upon knowledge 
from further outside the map itself.
A successful map is one that provides persuasive verisimil-
itude, or can afford persuasive access to propositions about 
facts, relationships, correlations, situations, or milieus. A 
successful map is one that can naturalize its propositions 
to such a degree that the map user accepts the map as an 
integral support or justification for the story they them-
selves have adopted.
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TAKE AWAY
Panofsky’s model provides a formal, structured means of 
examining how meaning is brought to the map by the 
reader. That reader first forms a primary interpretation of 
what they see using their understanding of graphic form 
(graphic literacy). By placing this primary interpretation 
into the framework of what they know about cartographic 
vocabulary and grammar, and by situating it against the 
horizon of the cartographic canon (that is, through map 
literacy), a conventional interpretation is construed. Other 
(topical) knowledge can then be chosen and deployed to 
bring this somewhat formulaic conventional interpretation 
into the user’s understanding as the “intrinsic” meaning 
(story). This chain of construal is kicked off by the map, 
but takes place almost entirely outside it.
Every map achieves a third-strata Panofskian meaning: it 
is the user’s sophistication in drawing on resources outside 
the map, beyond basic map-reading skills, that determines 
the fullness or poverty of that meaning. The mapmak-
er, however, can strive to structure their map’s rhetorical 
appeal so as to direct (and perhaps restrict) the reader’s 
choice of resources, in order to discourage mis- or count-
er-readings and to persuade them to tailor their construed 
story to fit the map.
Here, then, is the complex relationship hidden unexam-
ined behind the glib platitude “Maps Tell Stories.”
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